The European Free Trade Association and the European Community by Gardener, E.P.M.
E.P.M. GARDENER*
The European Free Trade Association
and the European Community**
The hypothesized economic gains from European Community (EC) integra-
tion have supported the apparent political and wider attractions (like greater
economic efficiency and improved access to bigger markets) of completing the
EC internal market. The well-known Cecchini study' produced quantitative es-
timates of the possible order of these economic gains for EC countries. These
alleged gains were considerable, but they have been strongly debated and, in
some cases, hotly disputed. Within the Cecchini study the estimated gains flow-
ing from the financial sectors were seen as particularly important, and a key part
of the Cecchini research exercise was the microeconomic study of the financial
services sectors. The prospects for closer EC and European Free Trade Associ-
ation (EFTA) cooperation have been very much on the agenda for some time. 2 In
1989, EFTA commissioned the Institute of European Finance (IEF) to study the
possible impact of the EC internal market on EFTA financial sectors using the
Cecchini methodology. This article reports on some of these findings. To begin,
the report sets the scene by examining the broader aspects of EFTA and EC
cooperation.
*Professor Gardener is director, Institute of European Finance, University College of North Wales,
Bangor, Wales.
**Parts of this article are to be published shortly as an EFTA Occasional Paper.
1. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN ECONOMY: THE ECONOMICS OF 1992
(1988).
2. See, e.g., P. KRUGMAN, EFTA AND 1992 (EFTA Occasional Paper No. 23, 1988); H.
WALLACE & W. WESSELS, TOWARDS A NEW PARTNERSHIP: THE EC AND EFTA IN THE WIDER WESTERN
EUROPE (EFTA Occasional Paper No. 28, 1989).
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I. EFTA and the EC
A. BACKGROUND
EFTA comprises an association of advanced European economies that, for a
variety of political and economic reasons, decided initially not to join the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC). The EFTA countries, 3 Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, are generally small; in total they
comprise an economy that is only around half the size of West Germany's. The EC
and EFTA combined represent a market of some 353 million people, producing
nearly 26 percent of World Gross National Product (GNP). This compares with
a U.S. market of 239 million (35.3 percent of World GNP) and a Japanese
market of 121 million (11.8 percent of World GNP). The six EFTA countries
(EFTA-6), on average, enjoy a greater proportionate share of this wealth than
their eight EC counterparts (EC-8), but they are considerably smaller (31 million
and 3.3 percent of World GNP). Table 1 compares and ranks for 1986 the EC-8
countries studied by Price Waterhouse Management Consultants (Dublin) (PW)
and the EFTA-6, using Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head of population.
The second general comparative feature concerns the structure of EFTA's real
production and trade. Table 1 has already highlighted the relative size of the EFTA
countries: collectively, they are very small in relation to the EC. This implies that
the EC is more important to EFTA than vice versa. During 1987, the EC accounted
for over 60 percent of EFTA imports and took over 55 percent of EFTA exports.4
Within EFTA, with one important exception, intra-EFTA trade is practically in-
significant compared with that between individual EFTA countries and the EC.
There is very little trade between the Alpine EFTA (Austria and Switzerland) and
Nordic EFTA (Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Although intra-Nordic
trade is more important than intra-Alpine trade-around six times more trade with
the EC compared with ten times, respectively-intra-Nordic trade is still much less
important than the corresponding trade with the EC.5
Norman suggests that these characteristics imply that the effects of interaction
between EFTA countries can be ignored when examining the effects of 1992 on real
trade and production. 6 This conclusion allows attention to be focused on the bilateral
interaction between individual EFTA countries and the EC. The one exception to this
pattern is Sweden. Intra-Nordic trade is dominated by flows between Sweden and
3. The founding members of EFTA were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom. In the spring of 1961 Finland became an associate member. The
future EFTA governments came together in 1959, and in January 1960 they signed the so-called
Stockholm Convention.
4. See A. SKALNIK, How WILL 1992 AFFECT THE REST OF THE WORLD? THE REACTIONS OF SOME
MAJOR COUNTRIES AND TRADE BLOCKS TOWARDS EC INTEGRATION 13 (Bank of Finland Discussion
Paper 24/88, 1988).
5. See Norman, EFTA and the Internal European Market, ECON. POL'Y, at 424, 427-28 (Oct.
1989).
6. Id. at 428.
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TABLE 1
EC AND EFTA COUNTRIES RANKED BY GDP PER
HEAD OF POPULATION 1986
Population GDP GDP/Population
(millions) (ECU billions) (ECU) Rank
EC-8
Belgium (B) 9.91 117.5 11856.7 11
West Germany (D) 61.05 913.7 14966.4 6
Spain (E) 38.70 211.85 5474.2 14
France (F) 55.39 741.51 13387.0 8
Italy (I) 57.22 617.08 10784.3 12
Luxemburg (L) 0.37 5.76 15567.6 4
Netherlands (NL) 14.56 178.98 12292.6 10
United Kingdom (UK) 56.76 562.41 9908.4 13
EFTA-6
Austria (A) 7.56 96.3 12738.0 9
Finland (Fin) 4.92 72.1 14654.5 7
Iceland (Ice) 0.24 3.7 15416.7 5
Norway (N) 4.17 69.44 16652.2 2
Sweden (Swe) 8.37 134.1 16021.5 3





Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS (1987).
Finland and, especially, between Sweden and Norway. The implication from this
analysis is that the effects of interaction cannot be ignored when analyzing the
possible effects of 1992 on the real sectors of Sweden or Norway.
The EFTA countries have generally faced different economic conditions and
developments throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and these have helped to condi-
tion regulatory and associated trends in the corresponding financial sectors.
Select macrosectoral data provide a broad indicator of some of these different
conditions. Table 2, for example, summarizes comparative data on the annual
growth of EFTA GDPs, current account balances, and year-by-year inflation.
Although Iceland appears an obvious outlier for much of the data comparisons-
like annual growth of GDP and inflation-there are other outliers year-by-year.
Table 3 shows the variability of broad monetary growth in five EFTA countries for
the two periods studied by Bingham. 7 Once again, there is some heterogeneity in
these data, both on a cross-sectional and time-series basis. For the period 1976 to
1982, for example, Sweden appears an outlier. Both Sweden and Switzerland show
marked differences (and in the opposite directions) in the variability of their respec-
tive broad money growths between the two periods summarized in Table 3.
7. T. BINGHAM, BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY (1985).
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TABLE 2
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE EFTA COUNTRIES




Austria 3.0 -0.1 1.1 2.2 1.3 2.6 1.4 1.6 4.2
Finland 5.4 1.6 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.3 3.7 4.8
Germany 1.5 0.0 -1.0 1.9 3.3 1.9 2.3 1.8 3.4
(Fed. Rep. of)
Iceland 5.7 4.3 2.3 -4.1 3.5 3.4 6.3 8.4 -1.5
Norway 4.2 0.9 0.3 4.6 5.7 5.3 4.2 3.6 1.5
Sweden 1.7 -0.3 0.8 2.4 4.0 2.1 1.1 2.3 1.9
Switzerland 4.6 1.5 -1.1 0.7 1.8 4.1 2.8 2.6 2.8
EC 1.2 0.1 0.8 1.7 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.5
Current Account
(in percent)
Austria -2.2 -2.0 1.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.4
Finland -2.7 -0.8 -1.6 -1.9 0.0 -1.3 -1.1 -2.3 -2.9
Germany -1.7 -0.5 0.8 0.8 1.6 2.6 4.4 4.0 4.0
(Fed. Rep. of)
Iceland -2.1 -4.1 -8.3 -2.0 -4.7 -4.1 0.5 -3.2 -3.7
Norway 1.9 3.8 1.1 3.6 5.3 5.3 -6.4 -4.9 -4.1
Sweden -3.5 -2.6 -3.7 -1.0 0.4 -1.2 0.6 -0.6 -1.4
Switzerland -0.5 3.0 4.2 4.0 4.8 5.6 5.0 4.2 3.3




Austria 6.4 6.8 5.4 3.3 5.6 3.2 1.7 0.9 1.5
Finland 11.6 12.0 9.6 8.3 7.1 5.9 2.9 4.1 4.4
Germany 5.5 6.3 5.3 3.3 2.4 2.2 -0.2 0.6 1.3
(Fed. Rep. of)
Iceland 57.5 51.6 49.1 86.5 30.9 31.9 22.2 16.8 25.4
Norway 10.9 13.7 11.3 8.4 6.2 5.7 7.2 7.6 5.9
Sweden 13.7 12.1 8.6 8.9 8.0 7.4 4.3 5.5 6.0
Switzerland 4.0 6.5 5.6 3.0 3.0 3.4 0.7 1.5 2.0
EC 12.8 11.7 10.4 8.0 6.8 5.8 3.3 3.1 3.4
Source: EFTA, CONSEQUENCES AND PROBLEMS OF LIBERALIZING CAPITAL MOVEMENTS IN THE EFTA
COUNTRIES (EFTA Economic Committee, Working Group on Liberalization of Capital Movements, Final
Report, EFTA/EC7/89), annex V (July 4, 1989).
Note: *1980-1986 based on consumer prices, 1987-1988 based on the private consumption deflator.
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TABLE 3
VARIABILITY OF BROAD MONEY GROWTH IN OECD COUNTRIES 1
Period
Country 1965-1975 1976-1982







United Kingdom 6.00 4.10
United States 2.61 2.36
















Source: T. BINGHAM, supra note 7, Table 3.2, at 57.
Note: 1. Standard deviation of annual growth of broad money.
Generally speaking, though, there has been a shift in emphasis in most OECD
(and EFTA) countries away from selectivity in monetary policy. One of the main
reasons for this shift is the changes that have taken place in banking and financial
systems. Selective policy, on the grounds that the market is not capable of
satisfying legitimate demands on reasonable terms, becomes less sustainable as
market imperfections are reduced. At the same time, these developments facil-
itate the creation of offsetting flows or channels of intermediation that lessen the
impact of particular kinds of regulations. This kind of regulation-avoidance (the
so-called "regulatory dialectic model") behavior has been an important expla-
nation, for example, of much active financial innovation.
Despite the different economic conditions that have faced many EFTA coun-
tries, there are other noteworthy similarities in institutional characteristics and
social preferences. The movement towards a greater market orientation in the
financial sector is one such common feature. The increasing liberalization of
financial markets, growth of capital markets, and increased competition are
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common to many EFTA countries. These trends have been particularly notewor-
thy in wholesale financial sectors and sectors exposed to strong international
competition. Other common institutional and social preferences exist. Since the
early 1980s, for example, private savings ratios of the Nordic countries have
fallen sharply. Although financial markets are, to varying degrees, different
among the Nordic countries, reforms in these markets have been closely related. 8
Several factors have contributed to recent household savings behavior patterns in
the Nordic countries, including financial market liberalization, high marginal
income rates, and appreciation in equities and house values.
B. FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTORS, CECCHINI AND EFTA OPTIONS
The financial services sectors were confirmed as particularly important within
Cecchini's computation of the overall gains from completing the internal market.
Up to one-third of the growth expected from the Single European Market during
the first six years will flow, directly and indirectly, from the expansion of finan-
cial services. The financial services sectors are of increasing importance within
the EC economy, producing around 6.5 percent of total value-added and em-
ploying about 3 percent of the total workforce (see Table 4). Integration of the
financial services sectors of the eight countries9 studied by Cecchini, the EC-8,
was estimated to produce economic gains of the order of ECU 22 billion. The
PW/Cecchini study focused on the eight EC countries shown in Table 4. All of
the following aggregated EC data reported in this paper relate to the EC-8, unless
otherwise stated or obvious.
These data in Table 4 illustrate why Cecchini and the EC directed particular
attention towards the financial services sectors. The efficiency of the sectors also
impacts on the efficiency of the other nonfinancial sectors that use the financial
system. Macroeconomic policy is influenced as well by the development of the
financial system. For all these reasons the EC financial services sectors are
especially important in the context of Europe, 1992, and the European Economic
Space (EES); the latter comprises the EC and EFTA countries combined.
The Cecchini study has been subject to criticisms. 1o There has been particular
concern and debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the single market
for financial institutions. For the moment, however, such criticisms and doubts
will be set aside, although they are discussed later. At the very least the Cecchini
exercise was a useful quantitative exercise, despite its flaws, in comparative
competitive conditions within EC financial services sectors. It also explored the
8. See Lehmussaari, Financial Deregulation and Saving Behavior in the Nordic Countries, 2
KANSALLIS ECON. REV. 11, 12 (1989).
9. These comprise Belgium, West Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and the United Kingdom.
10. See e.g., CENTER FOR BUSINESS STRATEGY, 1992: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1989); X. VIVES,
BANKING COMPETITION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Center for Economic Policy Research Discus-
sion Paper No. 373, 1990).
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TABLE 4
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR, 19851
Employment as Compensation of
Gross value- a % of employees as a %
added as a total of total for the
% of GDP 2  employment 3  economy
Belgium 5.7 3.8 6.3
Germany 5.4 3.0 4.4
France 4.3 2.8 3.8
Italy 4.9 1.8 5.6
Luxembourg 4  14.9 5.7 12.2
Netherlands 5.2 3.7 4.9
Spain 6.4 2.8 6.7
United Kingdom 11.8 3.7 8.5
EC-8 5  6.4 2.9 6.2
Source: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 1, Table 5.1.1, at 87.
Notes: 1. Defined in the narrow sense as credit and insurance institutions.
2. Including net interest payments.
3. Employees in employment plus the self-employed.
4. 1982.
5. This aggregate accounted for 95 percent of total Community GDP in 1985.
mechanisms and directions of some important economic effects that seem likely
(and on which there is a wide consensus) to result from the 1992 program.
The importance of the Cecchini exercise to EFTA is reflected at one level in
the apparent growing signs that the EC is committed to ever closer cooperation
with EFTA. The historic joint declaration of the concept of EES in 198411
indicated the EC commitment to stronger relations with EFTA. A joint meeting
of EFTA ministers with the EC Vice-President, Henning Christopherson, in June
1989 restated the commitment of both blocs to EES. 12 During the same period
the Austrian socialist party (the senior partner in the coalition government)
published a position paper on its intention to press for EC membership in the
summer of 1989.13 Most recently, on June 20, 1990, negotiations between the
EC and EFTA started, and these were based on a mandate adopted by the EC
Council a few days earlier. Officials hoped to reach broad and comprehensive
agreements on the EES by the end of 1990.
Another feature of this recent period has been the apparent strengthening of
EFTA itself as it has sought to attain a common negotiating position. "4 EFTA has
11. Following the Luxembourg meeting, the Commission submitted an action program to the
Council implementing the declaration and enunciating three main principles: community integration
comes first, the autonomy of community decision making must be preserved, and there must be a
balance between benefits and obligations.
12. See EFTA BULL. No. 3, at 18-20 (1989).
13. See Fin. Times, Apr. 5, 1989, at 2.
14. See Fin. Times, June 15, 1989, at 2.
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certainly received much attention from the European media over recent months;
the issue of EC and EFTA cooperation itself seems to have acted as a spur to
greater cooperation between the EFTA countries. However, differences among
EFTA members still persist. These internal EFTA differences, coupled with
requests for exceptions from EC rules, could make for strenuous debate between
the two groups on economic cooperation and related agreements. EC Commis-
sion President, Jaques Delors, urged in January 1989 that EFTA's structure
should be reinforced to make negotiations between the two blocs easier. EFTA
has already taken several positive steps in this regard.
These kinds of development support a belief that at least three possible eco-
nomic alternatives appear open to EFTA members at the present time: accession
to the EC, closer cooperation with the EC, or an integrated EFTA that remains
outside the EC. These alternatives are not, of course, mutually exclusive, but for
present purposes they substantiate EFTA's interest in the Cecchini study on EC
financial services sectors. In each or any collection of these alternatives, the
singular importance of the financial services sectors has already been substanti-
ated by the Cecchini study.
C. SELECT FINANCIAL SECTOR COMPARISONS
Table 5 (which may be compared with Table 4) shows gross value-added as a
percentage of GDP for the EFTA countries. Finland, Norway, and Sweden are all
below the bottom of the range figure (4.3 percent) for the EC-8 countries covered
by Cecchini. Excluding outliers (Luxembourg, 14.9 percent; United Kingdom,
11.8 percent; and Switzerland, 10.4 percent), Austria and Iceland both have
comparatively large financial sectors using the Table 5 GDP indicator.
TABLE 5
SHARE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR IN GDP, 1985







Sources: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS; E. Gardener & J. Teppett, The Economic Impact of 1992
on the Norwegian Financial Services Sector: A Select Replication Exercise Using the Price Waterhouse(PW)/Cecchini Methodology (Draft Confidential Report, Ministry of Finance, Oslo) [hereinafter
Gardener & Teppett, Norway]; E. GARDENER & J. TEPPETr, THE IMPACT OF 1992 ON THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES SECTORS OF EFTA COUNTRIES: A SELECT REPLICATION EXERCISE (EFTA Occasional Paper No.
33, 1990) [hereinafter GARDENER & TEPPETr, EFTAI; EFTA Statistical Survey,' in GARDENER & TEPPET'r,
EFTA.
Note: 1. This refers to a statistical survey carried out by Gardener and Teppett, with the help of EFTA,
under the project commissioned by EFTA from the Institute of European Finance (IEF), referred to in
the introduction to this article.
VOL. 25, NO. I
EFTA AND THE EC 195
Table 6 shows the economic dimensions of the main financial services
branches for EFTA and the EC-8 countries as a percentage of GDP. A compar-
ison of the EFTA range of insurance premiums (4.0 percent to 13.8 percent) with
that of the EC (2.2 percent to 8.1 percent) emphasizes the comparative impor-
tance of insurance (in terms of GDP) to EFTA. In terms of bank loans, Finland,
Iceland, and Sweden are all below the bottom end of the corresponding EC range
(93 percent for France); apart from Luxembourg (an outlier at 6916 percent),
Austria, Norway, and Switzerland are comparable with the other EC countries.
In terms of stock market capitalization, however, only Switzerland is comparable
with (and generally exceeds) the EC-8 range. The range (excluding Luxembourg
at 11125 percent) for the EC countries is 75 percent to 165 percent.
Table 7 summarizes EC and EFTA data on employment in banking and insur-
ance for 1985. Four out of six EFTA countries (Austria, Iceland, Finland, and
Norway) are roughly congruent with the EC simple average of 3.5 percent
(percent of all employment). Both Sweden (1.9 percent) and Switzerland (4.9
TABLE 6
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE MAIN FINANCIAL SERVICES BRANCHES:
INSURANCE PREMIUMS, BANK LOANS OUTSTANDING, AND STOCK
MARKET CAPITALIZATION, AS % OF GDP
Insurance Bank Stock Market
Premiums' Loans2  Capitalization3
EC-8
Belgium 3.9 1424 92
France 4.3 934 85
Germany 6.6 139 89
Italy 2.2 96 75
Luxembourg 3.1 6916 11125
Netherlands 6.1 130 165
Spain 2.5 99 69
United Kingdom 8.1 208 149
EFTA-6
Austria 4.1 107 57
Finland 5.8 58 42
Iceland 3.6 30 N/A
5
Norway 4.0 126 46
Sweden 4.3 43 566
Switzerland 13.8 135 487
EC-87  5.2 142 116
Sources: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 1, Table 5.1.2, at 87; Gardener &





5. Described as "undeveloped" by our expert contacts.
6. Represents capitalization of equity shares only-bond data unavailable.
7. Weighted average.
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TABLE 7
EMPLOYMENT IN BANKING AND INSURANCE BY COUNTRY, 1985
(4) (5)
(1) (2) (3) % of % of all
Country Banking Insurance (1) + (2) (3) Employment
Austria 68 30 98 2.7 3.5
Belgium 89 30 119 3.3 3.9
Finland 56 14 70 1.9 3.5
France 448 154 602 16.5 3.4
Germany 604 230 834 22.9 3.7
Iceland 3.7 0.6 4.3 0.1 3.5
Italy 379 10.4 2.5
Luxembourg 9.9 0.9 11 0.3 7.7
Netherlands 111 42 153 4.2 3.5
Norway 47 15 62 1.7 3.5
Spain 292 8.0 3.9
Sweden 61 22 82 2.3 1.9
Switzerland 110 51 161 4.4 4.9
United Kingdom 527 245 772 22.1 3.6
Total 3639 100.0
Sources: Price Waterhouse, infra note 15; Gardener & Teppett, Norway, supra Table 5; GARDENER &
TEPPETT, EF'TA, supra Table 5; EFTA Statistical Survey, supra Table 5.
Note: Figures in columns I, 2, and 3 are expressed in thousands.
percent) appear significantly different from these data. The high figure for Swit-
zerland reflects its importance as an international financial center, while the
comparatively low figure for Sweden is probably the result of many factors,
although quantitative restrictions on various aspects of financial sector develop-
ment are particularly significant.
These select comparisons indicate the marked heterogeneity within both EFTA
and EC financial sectors. Within EFTA the comparative importance of the financial
sectors (in terms of value added as a percent of GDP) of Austria and Switzerland,
the so-called Alpine-EFTA, is emphasized in Table 5; 1983 and 1985 value-added
data were employed inter alia in the Cecchini computation of the economic gains
from completing the internal market. Nevertheless, all of these comparative data
should be treated with caution. In producing these data, the IEF followed closely the
approach used by Cecchini, and this part of Cecchini's work is concerned with their
microeconomic study of the EC financial sectors. In this exercise Cecchini employed
Price Waterhouse Management Consultants (Dublin) to undertake this assignment. 15
II. EFTA Financial Sectors and the Gains from Integration
A. THE IEF AND CECCHINI EXERCISE
The primary aim of the IEF study is to assess the economic impact of 1992 on
the financial services sectors in the EFTA-6 under the assumption that prices
15. See Price Waterhouse, The "Cost of Non-Europe" in Financial Services, in I RESEARCH ON
THE "COST OF NON-EUROPE," BASIC FINDINGS 259 (1988).
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move towards a common level, the so-called law of one price prevails, or at least
the mechanism (direction of change) implied by this economic law obtains. The
latter "law" implies that after the internal market is completed, the price of each
financial service will settle to a common (assumed to be lower by Cecchini)
price, with the result that a mortgage, for example, will cost the same in all the
countries covered by the internal market globalization (or integration) process.
Economic impact in this context will reflect the economic gains from EC inte-
gration, and for this purpose the EFTA-6 are treated as if they were EC members
and a part of the 1992 "globalization" process. Furthermore, the study uses the
same methodology, data, and timeframe employed in the PW/Cecchini exercise.
In short, the IEF research attempts to replicate the results for EFTA that PW
might have generated in its EC exercise had PW assumed at that time that EFTA
countries were EC members. The IEF brief from EFTA was to replicate as
faithfully as possible the microeconomic methodology (the price difference ex-
ercise) used by PW in their input to the Cecchini study.
The core part of the PW study focussed on comparative price differences
(obtained largely by field survey) of sixteen financial products or services, spread
over the three basic financial sectors (or subsectors): banking, insurance, and
securities (or brokerage). PW alleged that this dataset was broadly representative
of the three financial sectors, and Table 8 summarizes the standard financial
services or products PW surveyed. The hypothesized price falls on these are the
basis of the computation of economic gains, the consumer surplus (CS) results.
The latter is the economist's concept of consumer gains resulting from the
simultaneous occurrence of lowered prices and increased output of each financial
service that resulted from completing the internal market (freeing-up competition
across the EC).
The empirical basis of the PW exercise is the survey of prices for the sixteen-
product dataset of Table 8. The price survey data relate to 1987 (the PW/Cecchini
survey was undertaken in July 1987), and it was necessary (for the IEF research
brief) to collect similar (in terms of products and timeframe) data for the EFTA
financial sectors. Under the law of one price assumption used by PW, the price
of each financial product is assumed to have settled to a low reference level price
(LRLP), which is computed as the average of the four lowest prices surveyed for
each respective financial product.
The results of the PW price difference (PD) exercise using these assumptions
are shown in Table 9.16 These data at least provide a "snapshot view" of
comparative competitive conditions. A positive PD in Table 9 corresponds to an
assumed price fall under the law of one price assumption. In the case of con-
sumer credit, for example, Belgium is hypothesized to experience a price rise
(negative PD) of 41 percent and Germany the highest price fall (a positive PD)
of 136 percent.
16 The Price Differences (PDs) in part 1 of Table 9 are expressed as a percentage of the
corresponding low reference level prices (LRLPs).
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TABLE 8
LIST OF STANDARD FINANCIAL SERVICES OR PRODUCTS SURVEYED
Name of Standard Service Description of Standard Service
Banking Services
1. Consumer credit Annual cost of consumer loan of 500 ECU.
Excess interest rate over money market
rates.
2. Credit cards Annual cost assuming 500 ECU debit.
Excess interest rate over money market
rates.
3. Mortgages Annual cost of home loan of 25,000 ECU.
Excess interest rate over money market
rates.
4. Letters of Credit Cost of letter of credit of 50,000 ECU for
three months.
5. Foreign exchange drafts Cost to a large commercial client of
purchasing a commercial draft for 30,000
ECU.
6. Travellers checks Cost for a private consumer of purchasing
500 ECU worth of travellers checks.
7. Commercial loans Annual cost (including commissions and
charges) to a medium-sized firm of a
commercial loan of 250,000 ECU.
Insurance Services
I. Life insurance Average annual cost of term (life)
insurance.
2. Home insurance Annual cost of fire and theft coverage for
house valued at 70,000 ECU with 28,000
ECU contents.
3. Motor insurance Annual cost of comprehensive insurance,
1.6 litre car, driver 10 years experience, no
claims bonus.
4. Commercial fire and theft Annual coverage for premises valued at
387,240 ECU and stock valued at 232,344
ECU.
5. Public liability coverage Annual premium for engineering company
with 20 employees and annual turnover of
1.29 million ECU.
Brokerage Services
1. Private equity transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of 1,440
ECU.
2. Private gilt transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of 14,000
ECU.
3. Institutional equity transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of
288,000 ECU.
4. Institutional gilt transactions Commission costs of cash bargain of 7.2
million ECU.
Source: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 1, Table 5.1.4, at 91.
VOL. 25, NO. I
EFTA AND THE EC 199
TABLE 9
ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL FALLS IN FINANCIAL PRODUCT PRICES AS A
RESULT OF COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET
B D E F I L NL UK
1. Percentage differences in prices of financial products compared with the average of the
four lowest observations
Banking
Consumer Credit -41 136 39 105 1 -26 31 121
Credit cards 79 60 26 -30 89 -12 43 16
Mortgages 31 57 118 78 -4 1 -6 -20
Letters of credit 22 -10 59 -7 9 27 17 8
Foreign exchange 6 31 196 56 23 33 -46 16
Travellers checks 35 -7 30 39 22 -7 33 -7
Commercial loans -5 6 19 -7 9 6 43 46
Insurance
Life 78 5 37 33 83 66 - 9 -30
Home -16 3 -4 39 81 57 17 90
Motor 30 15 100 9 148 77 -7 - 17
Commercial fire, theft -9 43 24 153 245 - 15 - 1 27
Public liability 13 47 60 117 77 9 - 16 - 7
Securities
Private equity 36 7 65 - 13 - 3 7 114 123
Private gilts 14 90 217 21 -63 27 161 36
Institutional equity 26 69 153 - 5 /  47 68 26 -47
Institutional gilts 284 - 4 60 57 92 -36 21
2. Theoretical, potential price reductions
Banking 15 33 34 25 18 16 10 18
Insurance 31 10 32 24 51 37 1 4
Securities 32 11 44 23 33 9 18 12
Total 23 25 34 24 29 17 9 13
3. Indicative price reductions
All financial services
Range 6-16 5-15 16-26 7-17 9-19 3-13 0-9 2-12
Center of Range I1 10 21 12 14 8 4 7
Source: COMMISSION ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 1, Table 5.1.4, at 91.
Note: 1. Observations for consumer credit in Italy and mortgages in Luxembourg and institutional gilts
in the United Kingdom were manufactured. Price Waterhouse Management Consultants (Dublin), Cost
of "Non-Europe" in Financial Services: Final Report (Confidential Report, Price Waterhouse
Management Consultants, Dublin).
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Our preliminary findings in this paper report EFTA PDs compared with the
EC-8 PDs using PW's LRLP. We also model the following two cases:
1. PDs using a LRLP derived from the PW and EFTA datasets combined;
and
2. PDs for EFTA countries alone using EFA survey-derived LRLPs.
These three PD scenarios correspond respectively to the three possible scenarios
for EFTA financial sectors discussed earlier:
Scenario A: EFTA countries are outside the EC, and EFTA financial sectors
are fragmented (nonglobalized) within EFTA, but each EFTA financial sector
becomes globalized (for example, with a strong cooperation agreement) bilater-
ally with the EC from 1992.
Scenario B: EFTA countries' financial sectors are globalized and become fully
integrated within the EC.
Scenario C: EFTA remains outside the EC, EFTA and EC financial sectors are
fragmented bilaterally, but EFTA financial sectors become integrated (or global-
ized) within EFTA.
This paper focuses on Scenario A above. An "economic justification" for
simulating A is that each EFTA country financial sector, viewed alone, is un-
likely to affect the LRLP used by PW because of the comparative size of the EC
financial sector. A more pragmatic justification is contained within our research
brief; it is the scenario that is initially the "most comparative" with the PW
exercise. It is "most comparative" because it does not entail altering any of the
PW dataset, and it is not always clear exactly how PW derived some of their data
and results.
Part 2 of Table 9 shows the weighted averages of the theoretical potential price
fall 17 for each subsector, and part 3 summarizes the so-called indicative price
falls. The latter represent a "scaling down" of the theoretical potential price
reductions depicted in part 2 of Table 9. This exercise, based on PW's compar-
ative studies and case study work, is supposed to represent the extent to which
the theoretical, hypothesized, competitive, and integrated conditions will not be
achieved.
The price falls computed by PW in part 3 of Table 9 are used to model the
impact on value-added (a proxy for output) and the gain in consumer surplus
(CS) that are hypothesized to result from the law of one price assumption. Table
10 summarizes the PW results. In using published data, PW generally used the
latest available data at the time: this was usually 1986, although 1985 and 1983
valued-added data were employed. Our basic research aims are to extend Tables
9 and 10 to include the EFTA-6.
17 It may be noted that parts 2 and 3 (unlike part 1) of Table 9 summarize hypothesized price
falls.
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TABLE 10
ESTIMATED GAINS RESULTING FROM THE INDICATIVE
PRICE REDUCTIONS FOR FINANCIAL SECTORS
Gain in consumer
Direct impact on surplus as a result
Average indicative value-added for of average indicative
price reduction financial services price reduction'
% MnECU %ofGDP MnECU %ofGDP
Belgium 11 656 0.6 685 0.7
France 12 3513 0.5 3683 0.5
Italy 14 3780 0.7 3996 0.7
Luxemburg 8 43 1.2 44 1.2
Netherlands 4 341 0.2 347 0.2
Spain 21 2925 1.4 3189 1.5
United Kingdom 7 4917 0.8 5051 0.8
W. Germany 10 4442 0.5 4619 0.6
EUR - 8 10 20617 0.7 21614 0.7
Source: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 1, Table 5.1.5, at 92.
Note: 1. Based on the assumption that the elasticity of demand for financial services is 0.75.
B. EFTA GAINS FROM INTEGRATION
Table 11 summarizes the price survey results for EFTA and the EC-8 under
Scenario A; it will be recalled that these PDs are computed using PW's original
LRLP for each financial product. A positive result indicates the percentage amount
of price reduction hypothesized under the law of one price assumption. Several
of the EFTA results in Table 11 appear extreme compared with their EC-8 coun-
terparts. Within the banking products, for example, credit cards and mortgages
are obvious cases. The credit card results for Finland, Iceland, and Norway seem
especially extreme; the mortgage results for Austria, Finland, Iceland, and Nor-
way also group as outliers in the European Financial Sector Space (EFSS), and
Iceland produced more extreme results consistently for several financial products.
Of course, the comparability of financial products in different countries is often
open to serious question. Several survey respondents expressed particular doubts
about the comparability of insurance products. These concerns related to differ-
ences in locational factors (like salaries and weather conditions) and to the pack-
aged nature of many products. Some financial products in Table 11 also had to
be "engineered" in order to increase comparability. Although these points high-
light some of the main product comparability practical difficulties encountered in
the survey, they are also a more general warning of the practical difficulties that
arise in comparing financial product characteristics and prices in different coun-
tries. Many of the products surveyed, for example, are almost certainly charac-
terized by different implicit and explicit cross-subsidization features. These data,
therefore, are best regarded as broadly indicative rather than specific and exact.
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The PDs in Table 11 are converted (using a weighing system) into average
indicative price reductions. The PW/Cecchini results for the EC-8 were summa-
rized earlier in Table 9 (parts 2 and 3). Table 12 summarizes our results for
EFIA, and these may be compared directly with the Table 10 results. It is clear
that the estimated CS gains (as a percentage of GDP) are highly significant for
all the EFrA countries. The estimated gains for Austria (1.8 percent) and Swit-
zerland (2.4 percent) are considerably higher than for the top two EC-8 coun-
tries, Spain (1.5 percent) and Luxembourg (1.2 percent). The EFFA range of
these results is also considerably wider (at 1.9 percent) compared with the EC-8
(1.3 percent); the respective EIFTA mean gain is 1.1 percent compared with an
EC-8 mean of 0.7 percent. It is interesting to note again that, within EFTA, the
Alpine-EFTA countries are at the very top of this range.
TABLE 12
ESTIMATED GAINS RESULTING FROM THE INDICATIVE PRICE
REDUCTIONS FOR FINANCIAL SECTORS
Average Gain in CS as
indicative Direct impact on a result of
price value-added for average indicative
Country reductions financial sector price reductions
% of GDP % of GDP
% MN ECU 1986 MN 1986
Bilateral Integration
Austria 29 1580 1.6 1789 1.8
Finland 15 359 0.5 381 0.5
Iceland 13 22 0.6 23 0.6
Norway 18 442 0.6 476 0.7
Sweden 20 976 0.7 1059 0.8
Switzerland 24 3038 2.2 3356 2.4
Sources: COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 1; EFTA Statistical Survey, supra
Table 5.
C. A CRITICAL EVALUATION
The microeconomic gains from completing the internal market are hypothe-
sized to result from the elimination of barriers to trade and the increased stimulus
to competition. They include cost reductions, increased efficiency in financial
sectors, a higher rate of financial innovation, and generally, increased competi-
tion. These, in their turn, are predicted to have resultant, positive influences on
important EC macroeconomic variables. All in all an extremely positive, prac-
tically irresistible picture of advantage for 1992 is painted. Our concern here is
with that part of the picture that relates to the microeconomic methodology
employed in the financial sector. Use of that methodology raises broader ques-
tions about the appropriateness of the microeconomic methodology in general
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and more specific questions about any special features of the financial sector that
warrant special treatment compared with other sectors.
A recent study by the Center for Business Strategy' 8 argued that trade liber-
alization of the kind envisaged for 1992 has its primary effects on supply and not
demand. This study cautions that the scale economy argument is far from un-
ambiguous. The study observes: "It is puzzling that economies of scale are so
widely touted as a source of competitive advantage when there is so little evi-
dence of their significance."' 9 And it suggests: "Successful operators in an
integrated financial market will be those who correctly exploit the scale and
scope economies that do exist without sacrificing the specialization that can also
be very important." 20 Although specialization is undoubtedly important in var-
ious aspects of financial sector business, one must be careful in dismissing the
economies of scale (EOS) thesis.
In fact the theoretical and empirical literature in banking is not altogether clear
on the EOS issue. Recent work in this field has suggested that scale economies
exist in banking, but these are apparently limited to smaller institutions, and that
the average cost curve for the production of the main products of banking (loans
and deposits) is U-shaped. 2 1 Humphrey's later work22 on cost dispersion in
banking drew particular attention to the wider cost differences between smaller
banks compared with larger ones. Revell's comprehensive study cautioned about
generalizations in the context of size and efficiency in banking. 23 He empha-
sized, inter alia, that there is no such thing as optimum size in banking and that
EOS exists in some aspects of the operations of all banks, but economies of
scope "are even more important, especially for large banks. ' 2 4
The work by PW has some undesirable "upward bias" in its interpretation of
economic gains. For example, PW excluded hypothesized price rises (those
negative-signed PDs in Table 9) from their "law of one price scenario," but this
exclusion assumption is debatable. When credit rationing exists for a financial
product, it is likely that price increases will result when the market mechanism
is liberated. The case study used by PW-London's Big Bang and its impact on
the cost of stock market transactions-also illustrated the price rises (in this case
on small, private trades) that can occur after deregulation.
In a more general context it has been argued that PW chose the wrong case
study on which to base much of its reasoning and hypothesized estimates. 2 5 The
18. CENTER FOR BUSINESS STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 2.
19. Id. at 104.
20. Id.
21. See Humphrey, Cost and Scale Economics in Bank Intermediation, in HANDBOOK FOR BANK-
ING STRATEGY 745 (1985).
22. Humphrey, Cost Dispersion and the Measurement of Economies in Banking, ECON. REV., at
24 (May-June 1987).
23. J. REVELL, MERGERS AND THE ROLE OF LARGE BANKS 91 (Institute of European Finance
Research Monograph in Banking and Finance No. 2, 1987).
24. Id. at 92.
25. See Neuberger, referred to in CLIFFORD CHANCE, INVESTMENT SERVICES 1992 (1989).
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reasoning here is that the PW study was concluded before the subsequent post-
crash (1987) shakeout in the City of London, before the full consequences of this
kind of deregulation were realized. The same study suggested that the EC textile
industry would have been a better general model. The industry is considered to
have benefitted already from the removal of EC internal barriers, but it is inter-
esting to note that an EC-wide clothing or textile industry does not exist.
Another criticism of PW is their downgrading of the hypothesized producer
losses that occur when consumers gain. One estimate26 is that the short-term
drop in profits for firms may have more negative economic effects than were
emphasized by PW or Cecchini. In the United Kingdom, for example, it has been
suggested that the profits of investment firms could fall by up to a quarter.
Increased competition in these kinds of financial sector markets, where profit
margins are already thin, may increase concentration and lead to monopolistic
and less efficient prices.
The fundamental point, however, is that our knowledge of the economics of
financial sector integration and the behavior of financial institutions and markets
is still imperfect. Although the PW/Cecchini price-reduction mechanism is un-
deniably important, it may be particularly oversimplified in the case of the
financial sector. In these markets factors like joint demand, reputation, asym-
metric information, access to delivery systems, and specialization are especially
important in particular segments. Barriers to entry may often be the result of
factors other than regulation. Nevertheless, regulation is an area that is partic-
ularly relevant to the financial sector.
PW and Cecchini focused on the welfare impact of a particular kind of de-
regulation process, which we may label structural deregulation. Structural de-
regulation simply refers to the means by which financial institutions and markets
are enabled to compete more freely. 1992 is the latest milestone along a dereg-
ulatory path that started over two decades ago. In this sense 1992 is not unique.
What is unique is the remarkable commitment of governments to the process of
deregulation over the period leading up to 1992. The other unique aspect of this
process is that it has been accompanied by an additional collection of counter-
vailing regulatory trends. In particular, there has been a process of supervisory
(prudential regulation) re-regulation, investor protection, and conduct of busi-
ness rules that also have increased in complexity, detail, and scope. PW/Cecchini
did not analyze this area in any detail.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that 1992 is likely to be associated with in-
creased competition in the financial sector, but that this degree of competition
will not be homogenous across all financial product markets and within each
country. A useful starting point here is to distinguish between retail and whole-
sale financial markets. The higher segments of the latter have already globalized
largely independently of 1992, although 1992 itself is likely to have positive
26. See id.
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competitive effects on investment banking and related industries. It is in the
retail and middle segments of the wholesale financial sector that we may expect,
at least in theory, to see significant competitive effects flowing directly from
1992.
However, these (especially the retail) market segments are those where prox-
imity, national and cultural preferences, and branch networks are especially
relevant. Experiences in Europe have already demonstrated the problems facing
foreign institutions who wish to penetrate national retail market segments.27 The
need for branch networks may make many retail product/markets restricted in
their contestability. However, the new alliances and sharing arrangements that
are developing across Europe are indicative of what might happen. It also seems
likely that the main merger activity in the run up to 1992 will take place within
individual countries. Retail and home markets are also more likely to be "de-
fended" in various ways by national governments, and 1992 is unlikely to
eliminate completely or quickly all of these defensive propensities or opportu-
nities. As price competition intensifies, explicit pricing, quality of service, and
access to existing and new delivery systems will become more important. We
may expect specialized and highly focused financial institutions, in particular, to
demonstrate increasingly their ability to undercut the larger financial firms that
cross-subsidize parts of their customer base.
III. Conclusions and Implications
Many of the implicit changes hypothesized in this research are now consid-
erably advanced in many EFTA countries. In the Nordic-EFTA countries, for
example, major regulatory changes took place after 1987. At the domestic level
there has been a strong (structural) deregulatory trend towards market-oriented
financial systems. Financial sectors in these countries have also been exposed to
greater international competition by gradually removing regulations governing
capital movements. In Switzerland the domestic financial market has been highly
cartelized, but during the past year (1989/90) the Swiss authorities have taken
action to introduce more competition into the domestic market. All of these
developments indicate that the kind of economic adjustments implied by the
preceding survey and simulations have already started. Contemporary trends
indicate that this movement may be about to accelerate in some EFTA and other
non-EC European countries.
There have been strong criticisms of the PW/Cecchini microeconomic meth-
odology, and it is undoubtedly oversimplified in many important respects in the
case of the financial sector. The previous section outlined some of these weak-
nesses. Nevertheless, the PW/Cecchini work is important not only for the debate
27. See E. GARDENER & P. MOLYNEUX, CHANGES IN WESTERN EUROPEAN BANKING chs. 6 & 8
(1990).
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that has ensued, but also because the empirical analysis did produce some useful
evidence on comparative competitive conditions. At the very least, PW/Cecchini
provided a partial, "snapshot view" of competitive differences in some impor-
tant financial product sectors.
At one level, it is in this context that the potential gains to EFTA should be
assessed, and our results suggest these are relatively high. In CS terms, EFTA
(especially the Alpine-EFTA) stands to achieve considerable CS gains. The
danger is that this kind of partial and static analysis ignores the potential, wider
implications of opening up domestic markets to highly competitive predators.
High CS gains computed in this way imply ceteris paribus comparatively less
competitive financial sectors in many instances. This suggests an urgent policy
priority of strengthening these sectors as a prelude to increased competition.
Since the significant CS returns from 1992 are envisaged to entail concentration
in the most efficient producers, employment losses and other secondary, redis-
tributive effects may be particularly acute in those countries where comparative
efficiency is low.
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